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Summary 
Investment is crucial for economic development. Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) can be particularly beneficial by facilitating a transfer of technology, and 
managerial and organizational know-how to developing countries. A number 
of empirical studies document a relationship between social development and 
aggregate FDI. In particular, socio-political stability and institutional quality, 
democracy and political freedom, and labour standards, appear to have an 
impact on aggregate FDI flows. 
 
To get a more complete picture of how social development might affect FDI, 
however, studies of aggregate FDI flows should be complemented by analyses 
using industry level FDI data. There are several reasons why this is important. 
Foreign investment in different industries has a different developmental 
impact, and FDI policies should aim at attracting investment in the more 
favourable industries. Moreover, the sectoral composition of total FDI flows 
evolves over time, and to remain effective, FDI policies should target industries 
where there is substantial and growing cross-border investment activity. From 
an analytical point of view, studying industry level FDI brings us closer to the 
decision units creating the investment flows. Finally, from an empirical point 
of view, industry level data allows us to probe deeper into the relationships 
uncovered by aggregate studies. 
 
Our comprehensive review of econometric studies using industry level FDI 
data, reveals that extremely little has been said about social development and 
FDI. Instead, the available studies provide a patchy account of the economic 
determinants of industry level FDI flows. In order to establish the impact of 
social development variables, we therefore conduct an econometric analysis of 
FDI flows at the industry level. The results highlight important similarities and 
differences among industries.  
 
We find that democratic accountability has a negative association with FDI in 
the secondary industries, but a positive one in the tertiary ones. This result 
suggests that the relationship between democracy and FDI is more nuanced 
than indicated by aggregate FDI studies.  
 
Law and order is found to be conducive to investment in both the secondary 
and tertiary industries. Internal conflict deters investment in the secondary 
sector. Neither law and order nor internal conflict have any effect on FDI in 
the primary industries, which might reflect an ability to effect private security 
arrangements in the extractive industries. 
 
Corruption increases FDI flows in the tertiary sector, but is unimportant 
elsewhere. This relationship can be traced to the trade industry, and might 
reflect the frequency with which this industry encounters bureaucratic 
obstacles.  
 
Finally, we find increased ethnic tensions to be associated with increases in 
foreign direct investment flows. 
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however, that a causal relationship might exist in the secondary industries 
only. Moreover, the relationship depends on the inclusion of certain countries 
in the sample (Tunisia, Vietnam and the Philippines), making these countries 
prime candidates for more in-depth, qualitative country studies. Across 
countries, we find evidence that more ethnic tensions are associated with less 
FDI in the secondary and tertiary industries. 
  1 
1. Introduction: Reasons for analyzing FDI flows by 
industry 
Investment is critical for the economic prospects of developing countries. 
There is a strong relationship between investment and economic growth, and 
growth in turn reduces poverty in the long run (Levine and Renelt, 1992, 
Dollar and Kraay, 2002). Improving the investment climate of developing 
countries has therefore been a major topic in a number of recent World Bank 
publications (World Bank, 2003a,b), and the forthcoming World 
Development Report 2005 is devoted to this issue (World Bank, 2004).  
 
One particular type of investment that has been given much attention, is 
foreign direct investment (FDI). There is a widespread belief that FDI 
represents more than a capital infusion to developing countries, it also 
provides access to technological, managerial and organizational innovations, 
and other resources that would otherwise be inaccessible to poor countries. 
Creating a climate favourable for foreign investment has therefore been a 
much debated and a heavily researched topic. 
 
There is evidence to suggest that certain aspects of social development have an 
impact on aggregate FDI flows to developing countries. Social development 
can be defined as “development that is equitable, socially inclusive and 
therefore sustainable. It promotes local, national and global institutions that 
are responsive, accountable and inclusive and it empowers poor and 
vulnerable people to participate effectively in development processes”.1 
Econometric studies have uncovered a relationship between aggregate FDI and 
social development indices capturing socio-political instability and 
institutional quality, democracy and political freedom, and labour standards 
(see Kolstad and Villanger, 2003). 
 
The studies that have been performed on social development and aggregate 
FDI flows, have not been replicated on industry level FDI data. The studies of 
industry level FDI that do exist, focus largely on economic factors, not socio-
political ones. There are a number of reasons why it is important to 
complement studies of aggregate FDI and social development, with analyses of 
industry level FDI determinants. In terms of developmental impact, foreign 
investment in different industries differs substantially. The sectoral 
composition of aggregate FDI flows evolves over time, so to predict the major 
determinants of future FDI flows, it is important to know the determinants of 
FDI in the sectors whose share of total FDI is growing. From an analytical 
point of view, studying industry FDI rather than aggregate FDI brings us 
closer to the decision units creating the investment flows. Theories of FDI 
activity underscore the multiplicity of motives underlying FDI decisions. From 
an empirical point of view, there is a chance that aggregate data obscures 
patterns of correlation between social development variables and FDI in 
individual industries, there might in other words be important determinants of 
FDI that have not been uncovered. Empirical studies of industry FDI flows 
                                                 
1 http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/essd/essd.nsf/SocialDevelopment/HOME 
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also suggest that there are significant differences in the economic determinants 
in different industries; there might be similar differences in social development 
determinants. Let us review each of these arguments in more detail. 
 
The developmental impact of foreign direct investment depends, inter alia, on 
the degree to which a foreign firm invests in upgrading the resources of the 
host country, and creates linkages to domestic firms. Upgrading skills can have 
spill-over effects on the economy as a whole, and linkages facilitate the 
transfer of technology to domestic firms. Several studies suggest that skill 
upgrading and technology transfer differ markedly between industries. Te 
Velde (2002) suggests that skill formation in the host economy depends on the 
motive behind FDI activities; strategic asset seeking industries that “invent and 
implement leading-edge technologies, … require well-educated workers, whose 
skills can be augmented by specific training” (p. 14), whereas natural resource, 
efficiency or market seeking investors do not have the same incentives to 
upgrade skills.2 Te Velde thus suggests that “attracting skill intensive FDI will 
help raise ... human capital formation” (p. 24). Ritchie (2002) similarly cites 
studies showing that high tech industries are more committed to upgrading 
skills. Resmini (2000) strikes a similar note in suggesting that the “transfer of 
knowledge varies from one sector to another, and is more evident in high-tech 
sectors” (p. 667). The point is that if certain industries are more attractive 
than others, it is important to create conditions that draw these industries to 
developing countries. 
 
A different argument revolves around the changing composition of total FDI 
flows in the world economy. If policies to attract FDI are to remain effective, 
they must reflect trends in industrial location, highlighting sectors where there 
is substantial and/or growing cross-border investment activity. As an 
illustration of recent trends, figure 1 provides a decomposition of total FDI 
flows, into shares attributable to the primary, secondary and tertiary 
industries over the period 1986-2001. 
 
While the secondary and tertiary industries accounted for comparable shares 
of total FDI in the late 1980s, the figure reveals that the service industries have 
increased their share markedly since then. The spike in tertiary FDI in 1999-
2000 is perhaps a bit exaggerated, reflecting extensive mergers and 
acquisitions activity in this sector, but nevertheless the trend is clear. Service 
sector FDI has grown more important in total FDI flows, manufacturing FDI 
less so. The primary sector only contributes 3-11 per cent of total FDI in the 
period graphed. A further breakdown into individual industries could 
highlight yet more interesting temporal patterns, which could be used to 
inform policies to attract FDI in future. 
 
                                                 
2 This four-tiered breakdown of investment motivation is due to Dunning (1993). 
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Figure 1. A breakdown of total FDI according to the major industry groups, 
1986-2001 
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From an analytical point of view, a troubling aspect of studying aggregate FDI 
flows, is that investment decisions of agents with possibly very different 
motivations are pooled together. By using industry level data, the sample of 
firms included is likely to be more homogeneous in its investment motivations, 
and the results might therefore provide a clearer view of what actually drives 
investment decisions. Ideally, firm level or even project level data would be 
preferable, but since this is unavailable to us, industry level data at least takes 
us part of the way. 
 
Theories of FDI decisions do in fact highlight the idea that the motivations of 
investors are different. Though the basic motivation of firms is perceived to be 
profit or value maximization, firms may have derivative motivations that 
differ for instance according to the industry in which they operate. To take but 
one example, the famous eclectic paradigm due to Dunning (1993) suggests 
that there are four distinct motivations for foreign direct investment activity: 
To access markets, to increase efficiency, to access natural resources, or to 
control strategic resources. Dunning has been criticized for providing a 
taxonomy of investor motivation, rather than a model of investment. In the 
present setting, however, his taxonomy underscores the notion that there is 
considerable variation in investment motivation across industries. 
 
In terms of empirical estimation of the determinants of FDI, there are two 
basic reasons why it is potentially risky to use data aggregated across 
industries. One is that variables that do actually influence FDI go undetected. 
This can happen when data from one industry in which there is a strong 
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correlation between some variable and FDI, is diluted by data from other 
industries where there is no correlation. The other is that determinants are 
identified for the aggregate data set, that have no significant relationship to 
FDI in any industry. The latter possibility is perhaps more remote than the 
first, but it is still a possibility. Where the aggregate analysis identifies 
determinants that do reflect some real correlation at the industry level, 
industry data can provide additional information by pinpointing the industries 
that give rise to the aggregate relationship. 
 
Empirical studies of FDI at the industry level do suggest that there is 
significant variation in what determines investment in different industries. The 
most explicit test of industry differences has been done by Resmini (2000), 
albeit only for a set of manufacturing industries. Using a Wald test to see if a 
set of independent variables have a significantly different impact on FDI in 
different sectors, she finds this to be true for most variables. For our purposes, 
the implication is that social development variables might potentially have a 
different impact on FDI in different industries. 
 
In this study, we examine how social development affects FDI flows in 
separate industries. The aim is to establish if there are important sectoral 
differences, and if there are correlations that the aggregate studies have not 
detected. Section 2 of this report briefly reviews the findings of the literature 
on aggregate FDI and social development, before conducting a more thorough 
review of available studies on determinants of industry level FDI. A main 
conclusion is that while there is evidence of a relationship between aggregate 
FDI flows and social development variables such as socio-political instability 
and institutional quality, democracy and political freedom, and labour 
standards, the existing studies of industry level FDI say extremely little about 
social development. Instead, the industry level studies provide a patchy 
account of the economic determinants of FDI.3 
 
To fill in some of the blanks, we therefore conduct an econometric study of 
social development and FDI at the industry level in section 3. Our data on FDI 
is compiled by UNCTAD, using an industry classification that is a variant of 
the United Nations International Standard Industrial Classification of All 
Economic Activities (ISIC).4 From the top level disaggregation into primary, 
secondary and tertiary industries, there is a further disaggregation into 33 
individual industries. Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this report to 
address determinants in each of the 33 cases. Instead, we analyze the 
association between social development variables and FDI flows in the 
primary, secondary, and tertiary industry groups, before doing a more detailed 
analysis of certain select individual industries. The industries selected reflect 
the issues raised in this introduction, and also address nuances in investment 
flows at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. Section 4 concludes by 
summarizing the main findings of the study. 
                                                 
3 The review of past studies is fairly comprehensive. Readers interested in a short version only, 
can skip to the summary on p. 16. 
4 See appendix 1 for details. 
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2. Past empirical studies: Social development affects 
aggregate FDI, but little is known about its impact on 
industry level FDI 
Past studies of aggregate FDI have identified certain social development 
variables as important for total FDI flows. Since the correlations uncovered in 
aggregate studies provide a useful basis of comparison for industry level 
studies, a brief review of the aggregate studies is provided below. This is 
followed by an overview of studies on industry level FDI, which provides 
information on relevant explanatory variables for our subsequent econometric 
analysis, and provides a point of reference for our subsequent results. To keep 
things manageable, the review of industry level studies focuses on studies 
published in academic journals, with a slant towards recent studies using 
recent data. Throughout this section, only host country determinants of FDI 
are discussed, and significance is reported at the 5% level. 
Social development and aggregate FDI flows 
A number of empirical studies have explored the relationship between social 
development variables and aggregate FDI flows. Three aspects of social 
development that have received particular attention, are socio-political 
stability and institutional quality, democracy and political freedom, and 
labour standards. There is evidence suggesting that all three aspects may have 
an impact on FDI flows. 
 
In broad terms, socio-political stability and institutional quality exhibit a 
positive relationship to FDI, in the studies of Globerman and Shapiro (2002), 
Harms (2002), Biswas (2002), Habib and Zurawicki (2002) and Singh and 
Jun (1995). More specifically, Tuman and Eggert (1999), Kolstad and Tøndel 
(2002) and Kolstad and Villanger (2003) find various forms of internal 
conflict to deter FDI inflows. Similarly, Wei (2000) and Habib and Zurawicki 
(2002) find corruption to be a significant deterrent of FDI. Finally, Jensen 
(2002) finds state capture to deter FDI, Biswas (2002) sees a negative 
association of FDI with regime duration, and Oliva and Rivera-Batiz (2002) 
find a positive relationship between FDI and the rule of law. 
 
Democracy is also found to matter for FDI flows. A higher level of political 
rights and civil liberties has a positive association with FDI inflows, in the 
studies of Harms and Ursprung (2002), Kolstad and Tøndel (2002), and 
Kolstad and Villanger (2003). Kolstad and Tøndel also find a positive 
association between democratic accountability and FDI. Similarly, Biswas 
(2002) sees higher flows of FDI to countries that are more democratic. 
 
On the subject of labour standards, Cooke (1997) finds a significant impact of 
labour regulations on FDI stocks. Singh and Jun (1995) find a negative impact 
on FDI flows of labour unrest. And Kucera (2002) finds female educational 
attainment and female representation in administrative positions to have a 
positive association with FDI.  
 
C M I  
 6 
One should note that though the cited studies provide evidence for the 
importance of social development in attracting foreign capital, there are also 
studies that do not support this conclusion. In particular, variables reflecting 
socio-political stability and institutional quality, and democracy, exhibit no 
significant association with FDI in other studies (see e.g. Harms and Ursprung 
(2002) on socio-political stability and institutional quality, and Noorbakhsh et 
al (2001) and Kucera (2002) on political freedom). The results linking social 
development and FDI are thus not all that robust to changes in the data 
sample, or the variables used. 
Determinants of FDI flows at the industry level 
The studies that have been performed on industry level FDI, typically focus on 
one or a small set of industries. The number of published econometric studies 
varies significantly across industry categories. The secondary industries have 
met with the greatest attention; a number of studies have been performed on 
FDI in manufacturing as a whole, and on FDI in individual manufacturing 
industries. In the tertiary category, there are several studies on FDI in the 
financial sector, but little work has been done on other service sectors. In the 
primary industries, FDI studies are extremely sparse, which is surprising given 
the attention recently awarded foreign investment in the extractive industries.  
 
The below review of available studies is limited to econometric studies in each 
of the three main industry categories. There are, however, a couple of survey 
studies conducted on a cross-section of industries that deserve to be 
mentioned. In a sense these surveys present hypotheses, some of which are 
tested more rigorously in the subsequent econometric studies. 
 
Kreinin et al (1999) analyze a survey of the motivations behind Japanese 
outward FDI. Nine industries are studied, seven of which are secondary, and 
the last two agriculture and financial services. For each industry, the 
motivations cited by at least 40% of the respondents are presented in table 1. 
 
The table reveals some interesting differences among sectors. While access to 
local and regional markets (reflected by the motivations “securing local 
markets” and “establishing production and distribution networks”) is 
important for all the manufacturing industries, this is not a factor for the 
agricultural industry and financial services. Similarly, access to natural 
resources has a much higher level of importance for agricultural investment, 
than for investment in any other sector. And the motives deemed most 
important for the financial services sector, viz. financing and investing, and 
acquisitions and information, are unimportant for industries outside the 
service sector. So there is a case here for the idea that primary, secondary and 
tertiary industries differ in their investment behaviour. The motivations of 
individual secondary industries also exhibit interesting differences. In 
particular, access to cheap labour appears important only to the textile 
industry and the electronics industry, which at least in the former case reflects 
a labour intensive production technology. Another interesting observation 
from the material presented in Kreinin et al (1999), is that trade potential and 
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favourable government policies towards FDI are not deemed important by any 
of the industries surveyed. The impact of social development is, however, not 
tested by Kreinin et al. 
 
 
Table 1. Major motivations for investment, Kreinin et al (1999) 
Industry Motivation 
Agriculture Natural resources (76%) 
Securing local markets (53%) 
Establishing prod&distr networks (44%) Processed food 
Natural resources (40%) 
Establishing prod&distr networks (65%) 
Securing local markets (60%) Textiles 
Cheap labour (58%) 
Securing local markets (75%) 
Chemicals 
Establishing prod&distr networks (55%) 
Securing local markets (70%) 
Metals 
Establishing prod&distr networks (43%) 
Securing local markets (71%) 
Machinery 
Establishing prod&distr networks (44%) 
Securing local markets (71%) 
Cheap labour (49%) Electronics 
Establishing prod&distr networks (48%) 
Securing local markets (72%) 
Transportation equipment 
Establishing prod&distr networks (62%) 
Financing and investing (43%) 
Financial services 
Acquisition and information gathering (42%) 
 
 
Complementing the above survey, Alford et al (1997) conduct a survey of 
firms investing in Canada. Their results suggest that market access is the most 
important locational determinant for the manufacturing industries, consistent 
with Kreinin et al (1999). For the non-manufacturing industries, however, 
government regulations and restrictions are the most important. By 
implication, this study confirms the idea that manufacturing and non-
manufacturing investment is based on different factors. The government 
regulations and restrictions important for non-manufacturing investment do 
not, however, appear to include social development variables. 
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In sum, survey studies of investor motivations suggest that investment 
behaviour differs significantly across industries. In particular, there are distinct 
differences between investment in the secondary industries, and other 
industries. While investment in manufacturing appears to be driven primarily 
by market access, other motivations underlie investment in the primary and 
tertiary industries. On the subject of social development, however, the two 
survey studies are largely mute. 
Econometric studies of FDI in the primary industries 
In the primary industries, there appears to be only one published econometric 
study, which focuses on agricultural investment. Burnham and Epperson 
(1998) survey 81 US fruit and vegetable importers/producers. Using a probit 
model to analyze the factors influencing the FDI decisions of these firms, they 
find that firms facing higher US tariffs on their products, are less likely to 
engage in FDI activities, and firms that can capitalize on higher cost 
differences, are more likely to do so. Though these firm-level results do not 
directly address the question of host country determinants of FDI, they do 
indicate that labour costs and trade openness are important for FDI decisions. 
However, since their study does not focus on host country determinants, it is 
difficult to compare the results to those of Kreinin et al (1999). 
 
The sole econometric study of foreign direct investment in the primary 
industries, thus covers only the agricultural industry, does not explicitly assess 
host country determinants, and consequently does not address the issue of 
social development. No studies seem to have been published on other primary 
industries, in particular the extractive industries (mining, quarrying and 
petroleum). This gap is an important one to fill, given the fact that investment 
activity in the oil industry is frequently conducted in countries whose social 
development track record is fairly miserable. 
Econometric studies of FDI in the secondary industries 
The studies of manufacturing FDI can be divided into three groups according 
to their level of disaggregation. One set of studies estimates the determinants 
of FDI flows in manufacturing as a whole. Another set operates at a medium 
level of disaggregation, studying flows in several broad categories of 
manufacturing industries. A third set considers FDI in individual 
manufacturing industries, such as those at the two-digit level in the ISIC 
classification (see appendix 1). The first subsection below summarizes the 
results from the studies of FDI in manufacturing as a whole, and those using a 
broad classification of industries. The subsections that follow discuss available 
results for individual industries; food, chemicals, rubber, metals, machinery, 
electronics, and transportation equipment, respectively. For other industry 
categories (see appendix 1), econometric studies are unavailable. 
 
Manufacturing as a whole, and disaggregated into broad categories 
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The following three studies in one way or another address the question of 
what determines FDI in the manufacturing industries as a whole. McCorriston 
and Sheldon (1998) do a time-series study of foreign acquisitions in US 
manufacturing 1980-95, using acquisitions as a share of GDP as their 
dependent variable. This study also analyzes acquisitions in individual 
industries, the results of which we return to below. Bajo-Rubio and Lopez-
Puejo (2002) study FDI in the Spanish manufacturing sector, using a panel of 
20 industries for the period 1986-92. Though this study is on industry-specific 
determinants of FDI, several variables that vary over time but not across 
industries are included. In a similar manner, Campa et al (1998) analyze data 
on FDI relative to imports for 219 US manufacturing industries 1984-91, 
including one variable which does vary over time but not across industries. 
The relevant results of the three studies are summarized in the below table. 
 
Table 2. Econometric results for manufacturing 
Manufacturing    
Independent variable Positive Negative Insignificant 
Economic growth   
Bajo-Rubio and 
Lopez-Puejo (2002) 
Exchange rate expectations  
Bajo-Rubio and 
Lopez-Puejo (2002)   
Exchange rate  
Campa et al 
(1998), 
McCorriston and 
Sheldon (1998) 
Bajo-Rubio and 
Lopez-Puejo (2002) 
Inflation   
Bajo-Rubio and 
Lopez-Puejo (2002) 
Relative stock prices 
McCorriston and 
Sheldon (1998) 
  
 
 
As is evident from the table, the three studies have focused on economic 
variables. Of these, inflation and economic growth do not appear to influence 
FDI in the manufacturing sector. Exchange rates have a negative relation to 
FDI in two studies, which indicates that an appreciation of the host country 
currency reduces FDI. Moreover, one study indicates that expectations that 
the host country currency will appreciate, increases FDI. Finally, one study 
finds that higher stock prices in the home country relative to the host country, 
increases FDI. None of the three studies uses market access as an explanatory 
variable, as opposed to the survey studies of Kreinin et al (1999) and Alford et 
al (1997). Nor do the studies incorporate social development variables as 
independent variables. 
 
Resmini (2000) analyzes FDI flows from the European Union into 10 Central 
and Eastern European countries for the period 1991-1995. She disaggregates 
manufacturing FDI according to the Pavitt taxonomy, which has four 
categories: Traditional industries (e.g. food and textiles), scale intensive 
industries (e.g. chemicals, machinery, transport equipment), high tech 
industries (pharmaceuticals, electronics, precision instruments, air- and space 
craft), and specialized suppliers. The latter category is essentially a 
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miscellaneous one, and since there are no significant associations between FDI 
in this category, and the explanatory variables used, it is not discussed further 
here. 
 
The relationship between FDI in the former three categories, and purely 
economic variables is as follows. FDI in the traditional industries is affected by 
market size, openness to trade, and the size of the manufacturing base in the 
host country. In the scale intensive industries, market size increases FDI, while 
distance decreases FDI. The results for the high tech industries are something 
of a puzzle: While distance decreases FDI, and wage differentials between 
home and host countries increases FDI, as one would expect, market size and 
openness actually decrease FDI. The size of the manufacturing base in the host 
country also exhibit a significant relationship with investment in the high tech 
industries, but the sign varies across estimations. With the exception of high 
tech industries, Resmini thus confirms the importance of market size to 
manufacturing FDI found in survey studies. Moreover, the importance of 
labour costs in high tech industries such as electronics, is reaffirmed. In 
addition, distance and openness to trade emerge as important determinants of 
FDI flows. 
 
Resmini uses one explanatory variable which to some extent captures certain 
aspects of social development. The Operations Risk Index (ORI) from 
Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) is a composite index of 15 
criteria, which assesses the business environment of a country. Among the 15 
criteria are policy continuity, bureaucratic delays, and enforceability of 
contracts, all relevant from a social development point of view. The ORI index 
proves significant and positive for both scale intensive and high tech 
industries, which indicates that social development might affect investment in 
these industries positively. For the traditional industries, however, there is no 
significant association. However, since the ORI index also includes many 
factors not related to social development, it is hard to draw firm conclusions 
on the basis of these results. 
The food industry 
Three studies have been performed on the food processing industry. Two of 
these studies analyze several industries, of which the food industry is one. The 
first of these is the study by McCorriston and Sheldon (1998), already 
mentioned above. The second is a study by Xing and Kolstad (2002), which 
examines US capital outflows to 22 countries in six industries, one of which is 
food processing. The results for the other industries are presented under the 
appropriate headings. Finally, Gopinath et al (1999) is dedicated to the 
analysis of the food industry only, studying US FDI into ten developed 
countries, 1982-94. Relevant variables used in the three studies are 
summarized in the below table. 
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Table 3. Econometric results for the food industry 
Food industry    
Independent variable Positive Negative Insignificant 
GNP/cap 
Gopinath et al 
(1999)   
GDP/cap   
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
Wages  
Gopinath et al 
(1999)  
Exchange rate  
Gopinath et al 
(1999), 
McCorriston and 
Sheldon (1998) 
 
Food producer subsidies   
Gopinath et al 
(1999) 
Relative stock prices   
McCorriston and 
Sheldon (1998) 
Corporate income tax   
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
Environmental regulations   
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
 
 
The results on market size (measured as GNP or GDP per capita) are 
conflicting, with one study saying FDI is attracted by it, and another that is 
inconsequential. One study suggests that lower wages brings more FDI in the 
food industry. Two studies also find host country currency appreciations to 
deter FDI. A final four variables are found insignificant: Food producer 
subsidies, relative stock prices, corporate income tax, and environmental 
regulations. None of the three studies include social development variables. 
The chemical industry 
McCorriston and Sheldon (1998) and Xing and Kolstad (2002) also provide 
results for the chemical industry. The latter study finds market size to be 
insignificant for FDI in this industry, which contradicts the results of Kreinin 
et al (1999) and Resmini (2000). Exchange rates and corporate income tax are 
also found insignificant for this industry. McCorriston and Sheldon do, 
however, find relative stock prices to matter for acquisitions in this industry. 
And Xing and Kolstad (2002) finds a negative relation between environmental 
regulations and FDI in chemicals, which they explain by high pollution control 
costs in this industry. As already indicated, no social development variables 
are examined by the two studies. 
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Table 4. Econometric results for the chemical industry 
Chemicals    
Independent variable Positive Negative Insignificant 
GDP/cap   
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
Exchange rate   
McCorriston and 
Sheldon (1998) 
Relative stock prices 
McCorriston and 
Sheldon (1998)   
Corporate income tax   
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
Environmental regulations  
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002)  
 
 
Rubber and plastic products: The tire manufacturing industry 
The only study of the rubber industry actually focuses on a sub-category 
thereof; the tire manufacturing industry. Ito and Rose (2002) analyze data on 
FDI activities by a limited number of tire manufacturers in 54 host countries, 
1982-1992. As the below table reveals, market size (as measured by GDP) has 
a positive association with FDI in tire manufacturing, whereas distance to the 
home market is negative for FDI. This is consistent with the results of Resmini 
(2000) on scale intensive industries. Two more variables are insignificant, 
political risk and the tax rate of the host country. The political risk index used 
is the credit rating from Institutional Investors, which to a large extent is 
based on economic variables. The index used thus to a very limited degree 
reflects social development. 
 
Table 5. Econometric results for tire manufacturing 
Tire manufacturing    
Independent variable Positive Negative Insignificant 
GDP Ito and Rose 
(2002) 
  
Air distance home-host  
Ito and Rose 
(2002) 
 
Tax rate   
Ito and Rose 
(2002) 
Political risk   
Ito and Rose 
(2002) 
 
 
Metals and metal products 
McCorriston and Sheldon (1998) and Xing and Kolstad (2002) both study the 
determinants of FDI in metal manufacturing. However, while the former 
examines fabricated metals, the latter focuses on primary metals. The below 
table nevertheless summarizes the results from both studies. Again, Xing and 
Kolstad find FDI to be unaffected by market size, contrary to Kreinin et al 
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(1999). They also find corporate income taxes and environmental regulations 
insignificant. McCorriston and Sheldon, on the other hand, find acquisitions 
in the industry to be affected positively by increases in home country stock 
prices, and negatively affected by host country currency appreciations. As 
before, no social development variables have been studied for this industry 
group. 
 
Table 6. Econometric results for metals and metal products 
Metals    
Independent variable Positive Negative Insignificant 
GDP/cap   
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
Exchange rate  
McCorriston and 
Sheldon (1998)  
Relative stock prices 
McCorriston and 
Sheldon (1998)   
Corporate income tax   
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
Environmental regulations   
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
 
 
Machinery 
The two available studies on the machinery industry are also by McCorriston 
and Sheldon (1998) and Xing and Kolstad (2002). The below table reveals 
that the two studies have relatively little to say on the determinants of FDI in 
this industry. All five explanatory variables, none of which reflects social 
development, prove insignificant.  
 
Table 7. Econometric results for the machinery industry 
Machinery    
Independent variable Positive Negative Insignificant 
GDP/cap   Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
Exchange rate   
McCorriston and 
Sheldon (1998) 
Relative stock prices   
McCorriston and 
Sheldon (1998) 
Corporate income tax   
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
Environmental regulations   
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
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Electrical and electronic equipment 
Of the two studies on electrical and electronic equipment, one is by Xing and 
Kolstad (2002). The other is a study by Kogut and Chang (1996) on Japanese 
investment in the United States, 1976-89. As for the other industries they 
study, Xing and Kolstad fail to find market size significant for FDI in this 
industry. They also find environmental regulations insignificant. They do, 
however, find investment to be higher in countries with higher corporate 
taxes, which they dismiss as counter-intuitive, though it might be the flip side 
of greater investment in human capital. The only host country determinant 
included in the study by Kogut and Chang, exchange rates, has a negative 
association with FDI, meaning that a host country currency appreciation 
decreases FDI in the electronics industry. Neither of the two available studies 
discuss social development variables. 
 
Table 8. Econometric results for electrical and electronics equipment 
Electronics    
Independent variable Positive Negative Insignificant 
GDP/cap   Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
Exchange rate  
Kogut and Chang 
(1996)  
Corporate income tax 
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
  
Environmental regulations   
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
 
 
Transportation equipment 
The final secondary category for which there are econometric results available 
is that of transportation equipment. Once more, Xing and Kolstad (2002) 
provide results for this category. In addition, a study by Co (1997) looks 
solely at investment in the automobile industry, by Japanese firms in the US 
1974-92. The results of the two studies, summarized below, are not very 
informative. Market size (measured by GDP per capita and disposable income 
per capita) is insignificant, as are exchange rates, interest rates, taxes, and 
environmental regulations. Co includes a variable reflecting labour standards, 
but this also turns out insignificant. 
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Table 9. Econometric results for transportation equipment 
Transportation equipment    
Independent variable Positive Negative Insignificant 
GDP/cap   
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
Disposable income/capita   Co (1997) 
Exchange rate   Co (1997) 
Automobile financing interest 
rate   Co (1997) 
Corporate income tax   
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) 
US 1986 tax reform dummy   Co (1997) 
Environmental regulations   
Xing and Kolstad 
(2002), 
Co (1997) 
Labour standards   Co (1997) 
 
 
Econometric studies of FDI in the tertiary industries 
The available econometric studies of service industries, are all of financial 
industries. Their scope and design differ, however. Yamori (1998) analyzes 
Japanese finance industry FDI flows into 39 countries 1990-94. Miller and 
Parkhe (1998) study the determinants of US banks’ asset in 32 countries. And, 
finally, Moshiran (1997) examines determinants of FDI stocks in the US 
insurance industry, using time series data. Though these studies might be 
difficult to compare, examining different sections of the financial industry, and 
using very different dependent variables, for ease of exposition we summarize 
their results in table 10. 
 
Market size is suggested as an important determinant of finance sector FDI, by 
both Yamori (1998) and Moshiran (1997), using GNP per capita and wealth 
as proxies for market size. Miller and Parkhe (1998) find a similar result for 
the banking sector, where host countries with a greater sum of deposits get 
more banking FDI. Market growth, however, appears to have a negative 
impact on FDI, as judged by the negative relationship between GNP change 
and FDI found by Yamori. There are conflicting results on how the level of 
trade with the home country affects FDI, and Moshiran finds a negative 
impact of the host country level of trade on FDI. Contrary to the findings for 
some manufacturing sectors, Moshiran finds a host country currency 
appreciation to increase FDI in the insurance industry. He also finds a higher 
rate of return to attract FDI, whereas wages have no effect. All three studies 
cited in the table 10 see a positive impact of total FDI or FDI in the 
manufacturing sector, on FDI in the financial industries, suggesting that 
financial firms follow their clients abroad.5 Finally, Yamori gets conflicting 
                                                 
5 In earlier studies, Nigh et al (1986), Sabi (1988), and Goldberg and Johnson (1990) all find 
FDI in finance to be affected positively by total FDI flows. Goldberg and Johnson (1990) also 
confirm the importance of market size for finance industry FDI. Cf. Yamori (1998). 
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results for the country risk index from Euromoney. As economic variables 
comprise 75% of this index, it reflects social development only to a very 
limited degree, which makes it hard to draw any meaningful conclusions from 
the results on this variable. 
 
Table 10. Econometric results for financial services 
Finance    
Independent variable Positive Negative Insignificant 
GNP/cap Yamori (1998)   
Wealth Moshiran (1997)   
Long run change GNP   Yamori (1998)  
M2/GNP   Yamori (1998) 
Trade with home country Yamori (1998) 
Miller and Parkhe 
(1998)  
Trade (host country)  Moshiran (1997)  
Exchange rate change   Yamori (1998) 
Exchange rates Moshiran (1997)   
Real interest rate   Yamori (1998) 
Rate of return Moshiran (1997)   
Wages   Moshiran (1997) 
FDI 
Miller and Parkhe 
(1998) 
  
FDI manufacturing Yamori (1998)   
Stock FDI manufacturing Moshiran (1997)   
Stock FDI in banking  Moshiran (1997)  
Country risk Yamori (1998)  Yamori (1998) 
 
 
Summary 
Studies of aggregate FDI flows suggest that there is a relationship between FDI 
and social development variables such as socio-political stability, institutional 
quality, democracy, and labour standards. However, from the studies 
performed on industry level FDI, there is very little to learn about social 
development and FDI. Resmini (2000) finds that an aggregate index of 
operations risk has a significant association with FDI in scale intensive and 
high tech secondary industries. This index includes components such as policy 
continuity, bureaucratic delays, and enforceability of contracts, but also many 
components that do not reflect social development, so the results are hard to 
interpret. Of the studies on individual secondary industries, Co (1997) finds 
labour standards to be unimportant for FDI in the automobile industry, while 
Ito and Rose (2002) find a country risk index to be insignificant for FDI in the 
tire manufacturing industry. In the tertiary industries, Yamori (1998) gets 
inconclusive results on the relationship between a country risk index and FDI 
in the finance industry. The country risk indices used in the latter two studies 
are only weakly related to social development variables. So if we accept that 
there is some relationship between social development and aggregate FDI, very 
little work has been done to track this relationship in industry level FDI data. 
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Though the reviewed studies say little about social development, they provide 
some information on the economic determinants of FDI in different industries, 
which is valuable to the choice of control variables in further analysis. In the 
primary industries, the available information is extremely limited. Existing 
studies of the agricultural industry suggest that access to natural resources, 
tariffs and labour costs might be important determinants of FDI. 
Unfortunately, systematic studies of the determinants of FDI in the mining, 
quarrying and petroleum industries are even more limited. 
 
In the secondary industries, there is evidence suggesting that market size is an 
important determinant of FDI in manufacturing as a whole, and in broad 
industry categories. Exchange rates also seem to affect FDI in manufacturing. 
Openness to trade appears to influence foreign investment in traditional and 
high tech industries, while home-host distance affects FDI in scale intensive 
and high tech industries. In addition, labour costs appear to have an impact on 
FDI in high tech secondary industries. 
 
The importance of some of these variables are confirmed by studies of 
individual secondary industries, and further variables added. Available results 
on the food industry, suggest market size, wages and exchange rates as 
important determinants. FDI in the chemical industries is affected by relative 
stock prices and environmental regulations. FDI in the tire manufacturing 
industry, a sub-category of rubber and plastic manufacturing, suggests that 
market size and distance is important. Foreign investment in metal production, 
varies with exchange rates and relative stock prices. In electronics, corporate 
taxes and exchange rates prove important. For the machinery and 
transportation equipment industries, all tested explanatory variables in the 
available studies were insignificant. 
 
Finally, studies of FDI in the tertiary industries, are limited to the financial 
industries. Several studies confirm that market size is an important 
determinant of FDI in finance. There is also ample evidence that FDI in 
finance is positively associated with FDI in general or in manufacturing, 
suggesting that the financial industry follows it clients abroad. Moreover, 
exchange rates and rates of return might affect finance industry FDI. So might 
trade, but the results on this variable conflict. 
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3. An econometric analysis of the determinants of FDI 
flows by industry 
Our data panel consists of 66 developed and developing countries over the 
period 1989 - 2000. We make use of UNCTAD’s new database that contains 
information on FDI inflows disaggregated according to industry, and we 
employ 12 different indicators of social development. Five control variables 
are used in this study, where GDP, trade, inflation and economic growth are 
taken from the World Bank’s Global Development Network Database, and we 
supplemented these with a year dummy.6 In our choice of controls we were 
constrained by data availability, which means that some variables used in 
previous studies of industry level FDI are not included here. The country 
sample and descriptive statistics for the different variables are listed in 
appendix 3.  
 
We take full advantage of the panel dimension of the data set. Thus, we are 
able to track how FDI flows are associated with changes in different social 
development variables over time, and not only within a country, but also 
between countries. Correcting for country-specific patterns of FDI flows is 
important in order to come up with some general policy recommendations 
that are valid across countries. Panel data sets also provide a larger set of 
observations as compared to time-series and cross-sectional data sets, and 
thereby increase the number of degrees of freedom as well as reducing 
multicollinearity in the regressions. Thus, the use of panel data sets improves 
the efficiency of econometric estimates. 
 
We started out with the view that FDI is likely to contribute to development. 
However, since development implies that a large share of the population must 
have increased their welfare, we choose to evaluate FDI in per capita terms. 
Hence, the dependent variable in this study is gross FDI inflows per capita, 
which then also takes into account differences in country size. Based on 
previous empirical work, we tested out five control variables in our 
regressions; GDP growth as an indicator of investment opportunities, 
macroeconomic stability as indicated by inflation, market size as measured by 
GDP per capita, openness as reflected by the ratio of trade (exports + imports) 
to GDP, and we also included a variable to capture a possible time trend. 
Several of these control variables proved significant in different industries and 
are thus included in the respective regressions. 
 
Table 11 gives an overview of the variables used in our analysis, and also their 
sources.  In addition to the control variables, we have 12 variables that proxy 
various aspects of social development, one of which is taken from Freedom 
House and the other 11 from the Political Risk Services group / International 
Country Risk Guide (PRS-ICRG). Note that for the PRS-ICRG indices, a 
higher score implies better conditions, whereas on the Freedom House index, a 
lower score implies better conditions. 
                                                 
6 See http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm 
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Table 11. Variables and sources of data 
VARIABLE SOURCE 
Dependent variables 
Industry level foreign direct investment per capita (logged) UNCTAD 
Control variables 
Gross domestic product per capita (logged) World Bank  
Trade (Imports + exports) as % of GDP World Bank 
Inflation (logged) World Bank 
Growth in gross domestic product World Bank 
Time trend  
Social development indicators  
Civil liberties Freedom House 
Socio-economic conditions     PRS group ICRG 
Corruption PRS group ICRG 
Democratic accountability PRS group ICRG 
Religious tensions     PRS group ICRG 
Bureaucratic quality PRS group ICRG 
Ethnic tensions PRS group ICRG 
Law and order PRS group ICRG 
Internal conflict PRS group ICRG 
External conflict PRS group ICRG 
Government stability PRS group ICRG 
Military in politics PRS group ICRG 
 
 
The 12 social development indices capture the following. We use the civil 
liberties index of Freedom House, which assesses the extent to which citizens 
are free to develop views, form organisations and assert their autonomy from 
state intervention. Socio-economic conditions is a composite index which 
captures a whole range of issues from infant mortality and medical provision 
to housing, unemployment and interest rates. The corruption index measures 
perceived corruption in the political system.  
 
The democratic accountability index of PRS-ICRG captures the degree to 
which a country has free and fair elections, but also takes into account 
whether elected governments are responsive to their electorate while in office. 
The PRS-ICRG index on religious tensions measures whether dominant 
religious groups seek to restrict civil liberties or political rights, and whether 
secessionist religious groups are present in a country. 
 
The index of bureaucratic quality measures the strength of the bureaucracy in 
absorbing external shocks, and its independence from political pressure. The 
law and order index measures the degree to which there is a strong and 
impartial legal system, and whether laws are generally obeyed. The ethnic 
tensions index captures the degree of strife that can be attributed to racial, 
national or linguistic divisions, while the internal conflict index measures 
political violence.  
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The index of external conflict assesses the level of conflict with other 
countries, and captures aspects ranging from trade restrictions and embargos 
to political disputes, armed threats and war. Government stability measures 
the ability of governments to implement its policies, and its chance to remain 
in office. Finally, the military in politics index captures the risk or reality of a 
military regime (PRS group, 1998). 
 
Since we only have data for investment that is actually carried out, we are not 
able to bring into the analysis investment that never took place due to the 
factors we are studying here. Our guess is, for example, that fierce internal 
conflicts would induce some investors to avoid a particular country. So if all 
investors go to other countries because of the conflict, then there will be no 
FDI observations for the country with large conflicts and the relationship will 
be grossly underestimated. Another issue is that data on separate industries 
seems to require a rather advanced level of data collection. Our dataset 
contains countries that have the ability to manage the disaggregated figures, 
and hence is skewed towards richer countries. 
Determinants of FDI flows in the primary industries 
Using FDI in the primary industries as the dependent variable, we ran a series 
of regressions testing the impact of the social development variables listed in 
table 11. The results of these estimations are summarized in table 12.7 As it 
turns out, the only social development variable to be significantly correlated 
with FDI in the primary industries, is ethnic tensions. This implies that several 
of the variables found to matter for aggregate FDI flows, have no impact on 
FDI in the primary industries. For instance, while aggregate studies suggest 
that democratization seems to increase the total FDI inflows, our results 
indicate that improvements in accountability do not tend to increase FDI flows 
in the primary sector. 
 
For the ethnic tensions variable, we find a large and highly significant (1 %) 
positive relationship with primary sector FDI, which implies that greater 
ethnic tensions are correlated with increases in FDI inflows. This result is 
robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables in different 
combinations, and is sustained both if we look at changes in ethnic tensions 
within and across countries. We supplemented the fixed effect estimation with 
OLS regressions to see how the levels co-vary when we do not control for 
country-specific characteristics. The significance of ethnic tensions is 
sustained; countries with higher levels of ethnic tensions tend to have higher 
levels of FDI flows. 
 
 
                                                 
7 For ease of exposition, we summarize the results from our econometric analyses in tables of 
the below kind, relegating the exact results to appendix 2.  
C M I  
 21 
Table 12. Regression results of fixed effects estimation for the primary 
sector. Dependent variable: log (FDI per capita) 
Primary industries    
Independent variables Positive  Negative Insignificant 
GDP growth X   
Year X   
Log GDP   X 
Log inflation   X 
Democratic accountability   X 
Ethnic tensions  X  
Ethnic tensions, lagged values   X 
Ethnic tensions, excluding 
Tunisia 
  X 
Civil liberties   X 
Law and order   X 
Internal conflict   X 
Bureaucratic quality   X 
Corruption   X 
Socio economic conditions   X 
Military in politics    X 
Religion in politics    X 
External conflict   X 
Government stability   X 
 
 
The result that increased ethnic tensions within a country seem to move in 
tandem with larger inflows of FDI to this country is something of a puzzle. In 
order to investigate this result in more detail, we disaggregate FDI to the 
primary sector into two main constituents; extractive industry investment and 
agricultural investment. The former category consists of FDI that flows 
towards mining, quarrying and petroleum, and accounts for 95 % of the 
foreign direct investment in the primary sector. The agricultural category, 
whose share of FDI to the primary sector is only 3 %, contains investment in 
agriculture, hunting, fishing and forestry. 
  
It is interesting to note that while ethnic tensions is positively correlated with 
FDI flows into mining, we do not find any relationship between this variable 
and FDI flows into agriculture. The result suggesting that more ethnic tensions 
seem to increase FDI inflows into the extractive industries is highly significant 
(1 %) and robust to the econometric specification. Is it possible that investors 
in the extractive industries can take advantage of ethnic tensions in the 
struggle to extract valuable resources like oil and minerals? If this is the case, 
why do we not see a similar pattern in agriculture? 
 
One hypothesis is that where there are greater ethnic tensions, the government 
may be in more dire need of revenue. This could stem from the possibility that 
it is harder to continue in office where there is ethnic rivalry; where each 
ethnic group struggles for power, more resources are needed to secure re-
election. Alternatively, if a government sees a low probability of being re-
elected, it may be in a rush to implement its policies while in office, or it might 
want to appropriate some of the resources for the benefit of its own 
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constituency. Another reason why we would expect more ethnic tensions to 
spur the government to generate more revenue is that it is costly to patch up 
social rifts of this kind.  
 
In any case, a more needy government implies that the multinational 
companies know that there is a greater possibility of keeping a larger share of 
the surplus, than with a government that is not in a strained situation. Hence, 
a stronger bargaining position for these companies might increase their 
investment in a country. This could also explain why we do not have a similar 
association between ethnic tensions and agricultural investment. If there are 
less possibilities for a government to tax investment in agriculture, due to e.g. 
lower margins (or mobile capital), then there may not be much to bargain 
about in the first place. If this is the case, then ethnic tensions should not 
influence FDI to these sectors. 
 
We will return to these questions in subsequent sections, but note also another 
hypothesis. It may be that FDI in the extractive industries and ethnic tensions 
are linked by nothing more than a common cause, such as the presence of a 
valuable resource. The idea that natural resources create rent-seeking and 
turbulence is a familiar one known as the “resource curse”, and investment in 
extraction certainly requires an object of extraction. If this is the case, we are 
talking correlation rather than causation. It is, however, also possible that 
foreign investment in the extractive industries might intensity ethnic rivalries 
for a share of the surplus. Thus, causality might run in the other direction as 
compared to the above hypothesis. 
 
Fortunately, the panel structure of the data enables us to test the direction of 
the relationship. If ethnic tensions influence the investment decisions, then we 
would expect that lagged values of ethnic tensions would be significant 
explanatory variables of current FDI. Four different lags were tested out, 
ranging from the ethnic tensions in the previous year to the level of ethnic 
tensions four years earlier. The lagged variables are highly correlated with 
each other, so, in order to avoid multicollinearity, each lagged variable was 
entered into the regressions individually. This approach results in insignificant 
coefficients for all the lagged ethnic tension variables in this sector, both in 
OLS and fixed effect estimation (see table 22). Note that increases in ethnic 
tensions last year is significantly correlated with contemporary increases in 
FDI in the primary sector, but this result is not robust to the inclusion of other 
variables. Thus, the hypothesis that increased ethnic tensions result in more 
FDI is not supported by these results. 
 
We also tested whether specific patterns in certain countries could be the 
source of the correlation between contemporary increases in ethnic tensions 
and FDI flows. It is interesting to note that the fixed effect results for FDI to 
the primary sector are dependent on Tunisia being in the sample. Excluding 
this country renders ethnic tensions insignificant in these regressions, including 
all specifications with lags. The above results are thus extremely sensitive to 
changes in the country sample. 
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Nevertheless, the OLS estimation still yields a significant relationship between 
ethnic tensions and FDI to the primary sector. This result is sustained even if 
Tunisia is dropped, but this country continues to impact the level of 
significance of this variable. This implies that countries that have high levels of 
ethnic tensions also have a high inflow of FDI to the primary sector. However, 
none of the lagged values of ethnic tensions are significant in the OLS 
estimation. Again, this can be taken in disfavour of the view that ethnic 
tensions influence the investment decisions of multinationals in this sector.  
Determinants of FDI flows in the secondary industries 
It is interesting to note that while improvements in democratic accountability 
do not have any impact on FDI flows to the primary sector, we find that 
democratization would decrease the inflow of FDI to the secondary sector 
(table 13). Moreover, democratic accountability is highly significant (at the 1 
% level) in this sector, and is robust to the inclusion and exclusion of other 
variables. Similarly, the results on the civil liberties index, affirm the negative 
association between democratization and FDI in the secondary industries. This 
may indicate that the creation of pressure groups, freedom of the press and the 
opportunity to participate in decision-making may actually be a discouraging 
factor to potential foreign investors in the secondary sector.8  
 
One possible reason why this pattern does not show up in the primary sector 
could be that it is often the more educated who participate in democratic 
decision-making. If this is the case, it might imply that democratization will 
work to improve the working conditions and increase salaries of the more 
educated. This, in turn, will reduce the profits more in the secondary 
industries than in the primary industries since the share of  educated domestic 
workers are higher in the former sector. Further, if there is unemployment in 
the unskilled rural segment, this will imply that unionizing and the creation of 
pressure groups may not increase the labourers’ bargaining position in any 
substantial way in the primary sector. From the companies’ point of view, 
then, there will be less of a negative impact from improvements in democratic 
accountability in this sector, and this is expressed through the lack of 
correlation between democratic accountability and FDI in the primary 
industries. 
 
When we look at the other social development variables in question, it is 
evident that there is a sharp contrast between the primary and the secondary 
sector. We are able to explain a much larger share of the variance in the FDI 
flows to secondary sector (34 % compared to 19 % in the primary sector), 
and several social development variables are found to be significantly 
correlated with FDI in this sector. Traditional strategies for industrialisation 
and development have highlighted the importance of increased investment in 
                                                 
8 There is little variation in the democratic accountability variable within countries, so we also 
used random effect (R.E.) estimation to look at averages across countries. The R.E. estimation 
is not rejected according to a standard Hausman test, so both approaches are valid. It turns 
out that democratic accountability does not show up as significant in the R.E. estimation, 
which implies that after correcting for individual country specific effects there seems to be no 
relationship between changes in accountability across countries and FDI flows. 
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the secondary sector. Our results indicate that governments have a set of tools 
for attracting FDI to the manufacturing sector if they focus on social 
development.  
 
Table 13. Regression results of fixed effects estimation for the secondary 
sector. Dependent variable: log (FDI per capita) 
Secondary industries    
Explanatory variables Positive  Negative Insignificant 
GDP growth   X 
Year X   
Log GDP   X 
Log inflation   X 
Democratic accountability  X  
Ethnic tensions  X  
Ethnic tensions,  
lagged values 1-2 years 
  X 
Ethnic tensions,  
lagged values 3-4 years 
 X  
Ethnic tensions, excluding Tunisia   X 
Ethnic tensions, excluding Tunisia 
Lagged values 1-2 years 
  X 
Ethnic tensions, excluding Tunisia 
Lagged values 3-4 years 
 X  
Ethnic tensions, excluding Tunisia, 
Philippines and Vietnam 
Lagged values 3-4 years 
  X 
Civil liberties X   
Law and order X   
Internal conflict X   
Bureaucratic quality   X 
Corruption   X 
Socio economic conditions   X 
Military in politics   X 
Religion in politics   X 
External conflict   X 
Government stability   X 
 
 
Law and order and internal conflict are highly significant (1%) and robust, 
and have the expected correlation. Thus, a society that improves its legal 
framework, or reduces political conflicts will tend to have greater FDI flows to 
the secondary sector. 
 
One explanation of why these factors are not important in the primary sector 
may be that this sector is dominated by mining and petroleum activities, which 
are highly capital intensive. We would expect that industries that rely heavily 
on a healthy and educated labour force would be more sensitive to factors that 
secure the workers, compared to industries where they need few workers. Few 
workers, much capital and large margins give the opportunity for private 
finance of security, as is evident in the oil industry. It may be much more 
costly for a manufacturing firm to finance security for a large local work force 
than for an oil company to make sure that their few foreign experts are safe. 
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For the secondary sector, however, we also find a significant relationship 
between changes in ethnic tensions and changes in FDI flows within countries. 
Here, the fixed effect estimation yields less significant (5%) estimates between 
countries compared to the primary sector, but continues to be significant at 
the 1 % level for changes in ethnic tensions within countries. So, as in the 
primary sector, more ethnic tensions appear to be associated with higher FDI 
flows in the secondary sector. In order to track the source of this correlation, 
we disaggregated the FDI flows into sub sectors with different labour, capital 
and knowledge requirements. Table 20 (appendix 2) shows the results for the 
food and beverages and the textile industry, both of which are typically labour 
intensive, together with the results for chemicals, which represents the capital-
intensive industries, and electronics, which is more advanced in terms of 
personnel skills and technology.  
 
The dividing line seems to run between labour intensive industries on the one 
hand, and the rest of the industries on the other hand. We find no evidence of 
any impact of ethnic tensions on FDI for typical labour intensive industries, 
like the food and beverages industry and the textile industry. Moreover, there 
is some evidence of a significant relationship between ethnic tensions and FDI 
for chemicals and electronics, which seems to be the source of the correlation 
we found for the secondary industries.  
 
This result is consistent with the hypothesis spelled out in the previous section, 
that industries that have high margins, and/or that are easy targets for 
taxation (e.g. due to immobility), may attain a better bargaining position in 
fractionalized societies. The chemical and electronics industries are capital and 
skill intensive industries that may find it harder to relocate than industries 
primarily using unskilled labour such as the textile industry, and margins are 
likely higher in the former two than in the latter. The former industries could 
thus be more favourably taxed in ethnically divided societies than elsewhere, 
which makes societies of this kind more attractive investment locations. 
 
Turning to the lagged variable approach, the results differ from those obtained 
for the primary sector. We find that increased ethnic tensions three and four 
years earlier will tend to increase contemporary FDI flows to the secondary 
sector, even if we exclude Tunisia. This result supports the view that ethnic 
tensions seem to influence the foreign direct investment decisions of 
multinational companies.  
 
To check whether some countries have a disproportionate impact on the 
results, we excluded Tunisia from the sample and then ran fixed effect 
estimation where one other country was excluded. Repeating this procedure 
for all countries reveals that two additional countries have a large impact on 
the significance of the three- and four-year lagged variables. Excluding Tunisia 
and the Philippines or Tunisia and Vietnam from the sample lowers the 
significance of the three-year lagged variable from 1 % to 10 %. Excluding all 
three countries makes the ethnic tensions variable insignificant. The four-year 
lag dropped from 1 % to 10 % when Tunisia and the Philippines were 
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excluded, while it became insignificant upon the exclusion of Tunisia and 
Vietnam and of all three countries. 
 
Running OLS on the full sample, with and without lags, and checking for 
disproportionate influence from certain countries, reveals a significant 
relationship opposite in sign from the initial fixed effect estimations. Across 
countries, then, more ethnic tensions appear to be associated with less FDI in 
the secondary sector. Since the fixed effect estimations take country specific 
characteristics into account, whereas OLS does not, the estimated OLS 
coefficients might reflect some unobserved country characteristic. The 
differences in results might also stem from the fact that fixed effect estimations 
are based on changes in the variables, whereas OLS is based on their levels. 
 
Even if our results do not reject the hypothesis that more ethnic tensions may 
induce foreign investors to take advantage of the situation in particular 
countries and thus increase their investment, further research is needed. In 
particular, it seems warranted to inquire deeper into the pattern that emerges 
for Tunisia, Philippines and Vietnam by conducting a qualitative study of the 
relationship between ethnic tensions and FDI in these countries. 
Determinants of FDI flows in the tertiary industries 
First, it is very interesting to note that changes in democratic accountability 
seem to be positively correlated with FDI to the tertiary sector, which suggests 
that democratization tends to increase FDI to this sector (table 14). Bearing in 
mind that democratization is negatively correlated with FDI to the secondary 
sector, and that the coefficients in both regressions are of similar size, we have 
the explanation of why this variable is not significant in our overall sample. 
Thus, the result from aggregated FDI studies that democratization is 
associated with more FDI probably conceals a more subtle relationship, 
namely that FDI to the secondary sector may be negatively affected by 
democratization and improvements in people’s rights, while there is the 
opposite relationship in the tertiary sector. This is important for policymakers 
because the industry structure will indicate whether one can use 
democratization as an instrument in attracting FDI. 
 
So if our results capture a causal relationship where more empowered people 
make a better work force that in turn attracts more FDI to the tertiary sector, 
this implies that it would be more profitable to start the democratization and 
liberation process in the areas of the country that offers opportunities for that 
particular type of investment. Moreover, governments that solely focus on the 
primary or secondary sector to attract FDI, or where there for some reason or 
another are poor opportunities for FDI in the tertiary sector, there seems to be 
no such extra benefits from democratization. Hence, one should promote 
other dimensions of social development in addition to traditional variables in 
order to attract FDI. 
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Table 14. Regression results of fixed effects estimation for the tertiary 
sector. Dependent variable: log (FDI per capita) 
Tertiary industries    
Explanatory variables Positive  Negative Insignificant 
GDP growth X   
Year X   
Log GDP X   
Log inflation   X 
Democratic accountability X   
Ethnic tensions  X  
Ethnic tensions 
Lagged values, 1-4 years 
  X 
Civil libert ies   X 
Law and order X   
Internal conflict   X 
Bureaucratic quality   X 
Corruption  X  
Socio economic conditions X   
Military in politics   X 
Religion in politics    X 
External conflict   X 
Government stability   X 
 
 
In contrast to the findings from the primary sector, but in line with the results 
from the secondary sector, our estimates suggest that law and order may play 
a role in attracting FDI to the tertiary sector. Moreover, the coefficients of the 
law and order variable seem of a similar magnitude in both the secondary and 
tertiary sectors, which implies that there will be a similar inflow of FDI in 
both sectors from an improvement in the legal framework. The result is very 
robust in the sense that it remains significant at the 1 percent level in both 
sectors no matter which of the other variables we enter into the regression. 
 
Based on the finding that internal conflicts are negatively related to FDI flows 
to the secondary sector, it is interesting to note that the same factor is 
unrelated to the flows to the tertiary sector. Hence, reductions in the conflict 
level of a society will increase FDI flows in the secondary sector but will have 
no impact on the aggregated flows in the tertiary sector. Disaggregating into 
sub-industries reveals that a plausible explanation for this pattern could stem 
from investors’ apprehension of having plants, factories or other less mobile 
assets damaged in conflicts. We find a highly significant relationship in the 
chemicals and electronics industries, while there is no relationship in textiles 
and only a weak relationship in food and beverages. However, we also find 
that the aggregated analysis of the tertiary sector, where no relationship was 
found between internal conflicts and FDI, actually conceals that there is a 
highly significant negative impact on FDI in the trade industry. 
 
Corruption enters significantly only in the tertiary industry regressions, and 
more corruption is associated with larger inflows of FDI. This is quite 
surprising for two reasons. First, we expected that corruption would primarily 
affect FDI in the extractive primary industries. Second, we would expect 
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increased corruption to decrease foreign investment. Investigating the 
disaggregated figures for the tertiary sector reveals that among the four largest 
sub-industries, which account for 85 % of FDI to this sector, it is only in trade 
that corruption is significant (tables 20-21 in appendix 2). Hence, it seems 
corruption can function as an instrument to elude trade regulations. However, 
it is an open question whether FDI in the trade industry increases corruption, 
or whether increasing corruption attracts more FDI.  
 
We find FDI in the tertiary industries to be positively correlated with socio -
economic conditions. Since this is a composite variable, however, it is difficult 
to explain the exact mechanism behind this result. 
 
Recall the initial result that increased ethnic tensions indicated that more FDI 
would flow to the primary and secondary sectors. The same result is found for 
the tertiary sector. However, disaggregating the tertiary sector reveals that 
among the four largest industries, it is only in the trade sector that this result is 
sustained. We do not find any relationship between ethnic tensions and 
foreign investment in transport, business or finance. However, these results do 
not shed light on our hypothesis regarding the association between ethnic 
tensions and FDI because it is difficult to evaluate the mobility and 
profitability in these industries. 
 
Turning to the investigation of the lagged values of ethnic tensions, note that 
we only report the results from using one year lag (table 22) in the tertiary 
sector. None of the lags were significant in the fixed effect estimation, which 
indicates that previous increases in ethnic tensions in a country do not change 
the contemporary FDI flows in the tertiary sector in a country. A pattern of 
country dependence similar to what we found in the two other sectors is also 
present here. The significant relationship between increases in ethnic tensions 
and increased FDI flows to this sector hinges on the inclusion of Tunisia. 
There is, however, less influence from including the Philippines in the sample, 
and Vietnam does not alter the results. Note also that OLS estimation yields a 
positive and significant relationship between all four lags and inflows of FDI 
to the tertiary sector when entered individually into the same specifications as 
reported above. Thus, countries with higher levels of ethnic tensions have 
lower inflows of FDI, which again might reflect country specific 
characteristics.  
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4. Concluding remarks 
In the literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment, very little 
work has been done on the topic of social development and industry level FDI. 
In this report, we conduct an econometric study which suggests that there are 
important sectoral differences in the relationship between social development 
variables and FDI. In addition, this study complements aggregate FDI studies 
in important ways, by casting doubt on some aggregate results, providing 
more nuance to others, and by identifying relationships not uncovered by 
aggregate studies. 
 
Democratic accountability is negatively associated with FDI in the secondary 
industries, and positively associated with FDI in the tertiary industries. This 
suggests that the relationship between democratization and FDI is a more 
complex one than suggested by aggregate studies. Given the trend towards 
more service sector FDI in recent years, democratization becomes an 
important variable to consider. Moreover, in high tech secondary industries 
such as electronics, reputed to have substantial spillover effects on host 
country economies, democratization in the form of civil liberties appears to 
increase FDI. In the primary sector, we find no evidence that foreign investors 
care about the level of democracy in host countries. 
 
Law and order is associated with increases in FDI in the secondary and 
tertiary industries. Internal conflict appears to decrease FDI in the secondary 
sector. That these aspects of a stable and predictable business environment 
have an impact on investor behaviour is not all that surprising, nevertheless, 
aggregate FDI studies have provided very mixed evidence on law and order. 
Neither law and order nor internal conflict affect FDI in the primary sectors, 
which might reflect an ability to make private security arrangements in the 
extractive industries. 
 
Corruption is only related to FDI in the tertiary industries, where a higher 
level of corruption attracts foreign investment. This relationship can be traced 
to the trade industry, and might thus be explained by the frequency with 
which this industry encounters bureaucratic obstacles. Reverse causation is 
also a possibility; higher investment activity in certain sectors might lead to a 
higher perceived level of corruption. With reference to the South East Asian 
economies, an argument has been made that corruption can actually be 
compatible with economic development (Khan, forthcoming). There are 
however, many attendant risks to a strategy of corruption tolerance, which 
make it an unattractive development strategy (Fjeldstad and Tungodden, 
2003). 
 
We find increased ethnic tensions to be associated with increases in foreign 
direct investment flows, which runs contrary to some aggregate studies 
(Kolstad and Tøndel, 2002). This result is not a robust relationship in that it 
depends on the inclusion of three countries in our sample (Tunisia, Vietnam 
and Philippines). We have suggested that the observed pattern might be due to 
shifts in relative bargaining power between foreign investors and host country 
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governments, a hypothesis that is not falsified by our results from lagged 
values of the ethnic tensions index in the secondary sector. However, to reveal 
whether there exists a causal relationship running from increased ethnic 
tensions to increased inflows of FDI in some countries as suggested in this 
study, it would be beneficial to probe deeper into this pattern by implementing 
qualitative country studies of Tunisia, the Philippines and Vietnam.  
 
As emphasised above, many of the findings of this study require additional 
analysis in order to establish the mechanisms behind them. Further 
econometric analysis of the industry level data we have used here will no 
doubt turn up yet more interesting insights, than the ones we have been able 
to incorporate into this study. Moreover, one might consider using case study 
techniques to examine more closely the specific mechanisms through which 
social development variables affect investment. As in other studies of the kind 
conducted here, certain methodological problems emerge. As noted several 
times in the interpretation of results, the question of causation is often an open 
one. Furthermore, the robustness of the findings should be examined using 
different data sources, sets of explanatory variables, and estimation 
techniques. 
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Appendix 1: Industry classifications 
Table 15. UNCTAD industrial classification, ISIC correspondence 
UNCTAD industrial classification ISIC categories included 
Primary  
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing  01, 02, 05 
Mining, quarrying and petroleum  10,11,12,13,14 
Secondary  
Food, beverages and tobacco  15,16 
Textiles, clothing and leather  17,18,19 
Wood and wood products  20,21 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  22 
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel  23 
Chemicals and chemical products 24 
Rubber and plastic products  25 
Non-metallic mineral products  26 
Metal and metal products  27,28 
Machinery and equipment  29 
Electrical and electronic equipment  30,31,32 
Precision instruments  33 
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment  34,35 
Other manufacturing  36 
Recycling 37 
Tertiary  
Electricity, gas and water 40,41 
Construction  45 
Trade  50,51,52 
Hotels and restaurants 55 
Transport, storage and communications  60,61,62,63,64 
Finance  65,66,67 
Business activities  70,71,72,73,74 
Public administration and defense  75 
Education  80 
Health and social services  85 
Community, social and personal service activities  90,91,92 
Other services 1120,93,95,99 
Private buying and selling of property  
Unspecified 
Source: http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/fdistats_files/WIDindustrial.htm 
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Appendix 2: Results from the econometric analysis 
 
Table 16. Regression results of fixed effects estimation for the primary and 
secondary sectors. Dependent variable: log (FDI per capita) 
Expl. Variables Primary 
1 
Primary 
2 
Primary 
3 
 Second. 
1 
Second. 
2 
Second. 
3 
GDP growth 0.051** 
(0.024) 
0.054** 
(0.025) 
0.050** 
(0.025) 
 0.030*** 
(0.020) 
0.025 
(0.020) 
0.023 
(0.020) 
Year 0.179* 
(0.025) 
0.194* 
(0.026) 
0.0196* 
(0.026) 
 0.157* 
(0.026) 
0.170* 
(0.027) 
0.165* 
(0.028) 
Log GDP     0.697*** 
(0.427) 
0.638 
(0.449) 
0.778*** 
(0.460) 
Log inflation        
Trade (in % of 
GDP) 
       
Infrastructure 
 
       
Democratic 
accountability 
 -0.296** 
(0.121) 
-0.209*** 
(0.124) 
  -0.212* 
(0.096) 
-0.180*** 
(0.099) 
Ethnic tensions   -0.390* 
(0.146) 
   -0.151 
(0.114) 
Constant -13.69* 
(0.21) 
-12.50* 
(0.54) 
-11.05* 
(0.76) 
 -17.92* 
(3.45) 
-16.54* 
(3.67) 
-17.11* 
(3.69) 
R2  
Within 
Between  
Overall 
 
0.15 
0.04 
0.01 
 
0.17 
0.04 
0.01 
 
0.19 
0.02 
0.01 
  
0.19 
0.56 
0.49 
 
0.21 
0.50 
0.43 
 
0.21 
0.50 
0.44 
# obs. 
# groups 
388 
58 
370 
54 
370 
54 
 463 
66 
440 
61 
440 
61 
* significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 10% 
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Table 17. Regression results of fixed effects estimation for the primary and 
secondary sectors continued. Dependent variable: log (FDI per capita) 
Expl. Variables Primary 
4 
Primary 
5 
Primary 
6 
 Second. 
4 
Second. 
5 
Second. 
6 
Second. 
7 
GDP growth 0.045*** 
(0.024) 
0.051** 
(0.025) 
0.046*** 
(0.025) 
 0.025 
(0.0) 
0.021 
(0.020) 
0.021 
(0.021) 
0.019 
(0.021) 
Year 0.172* 
(0.026) 
0.190* 
(0.027) 
0.0190* 
(0.027) 
 0.152* 
(0.026) 
0.166* 
(0.028) 
0.151* 
(0.027) 
0.160* 
(0.028) 
Log GDP     0.625 
(0.429) 
0.550 
(0.453) 
0.723 
(0.465) 
0.694 
(0.464) 
Democratic 
accountab. 
 -0.281** 
(0.123) 
-0.190 
(0.126) 
  -0.191** 
(0.097) 
 -0.157 
(0.100) 
Ethnic tensions   -0.396* 
(0.147) 
   -0.200*** 
(0.111) 
-0.155 
(0.114) 
Civil liberties 0.216 
(0.180) 
0.137 
(0.184) 
0.162 
(0.182) 
 0.287** 
(0.144) 
0.261*** 
(0.149) 
0.296** 
(0.147) 
0.267*** 
(0.148) 
Constant -14.22* 
(0.49) 
-12.90* 
(0.75) 
-11.50* 
(0.91) 
 -18.05* 
(3.45) 
-16.55* 
(3.68) 
-17.90* 
(3.68) 
-17.15* 
(3.70) 
R2  
Within 
Between  
Overall 
 
0.15 
0.06 
0.00 
 
0.17 
0.04 
0.00 
 
0.19 
0.03 
0.00 
  
0.20 
0.42 
0.39 
 
0.21 
0.15 
0.22 
 
0.21 
0.35 
0.37 
 
0.22 
0.22 
0.28 
# obs. 
# groups 
387 
58 
369 
54 
369 
54 
 459 
65 
436 
60 
436 
60 
436 
60 
* significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 10% 
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Table 18. Regression results of fixed effects estimation for the secondary 
sector continued. Dependent variable: log (FDI per capita) 
Expl. Variables Second. 
7 
Second. 
8 
Second. 
9 
Second. 
10 
Second. 
11 R.E. 
Second. 
12 R.E. 
Second. 
13 R.E. 
GDP growth 0.027 
(0.019) 
0.021 
(0.019) 
0.018 
(0.019) 
0.019 
(0.019) 
 0.030 
(0.019) 
 
Year 0.147* 
(0.022) 
0.128* 
(0.022) 
0.127* 
(0.022) 
0.131* 
(0.022) 
0.129* 
(0.022) 
0.129* 
(0.021) 
0.114* 
(0.021) 
Log GDP       0.939* 
(0.153) 
Log inflation        
Democratic 
accountab. 
-0.307* 
(0.094) 
-0.221** 
(0.095) 
-0.267* 
(0.095) 
-0.234* 
(0.096) 
-0.120 
(0.093) 
-0.114 
(0.093) 
-0.082 
(0.090) 
Ethnic tensions  -0.419* 
(0.115) 
-0.504* 
(0.116) 
-0.503* 
(0.116) 
-0.225** 
(0.106) 
-0.221** 
(0.101) 
-0.225** 
(0.096) 
Civil liberties  0.248*** 
(0.140) 
0.254** 
(0.138) 
0.238*** 
(0.138) 
-0.159 
(0.101) 
-0.184*** 
(0.103) 
0.062 
(0.103) 
Law and order 0.609* 
(0.108) 
0.767* 
(0.116) 
0.582* 
(0.128) 
0.622* 
(0.130) 
0.586* 
(0.116) 
0.582* 
(0.116) 
0.384* 
(0.114) 
Internal 
conflict 
  0.171* 
(0.053) 
0.170* 
(0.053) 
0.135* 
(0.053) 
0.133* 
(0.053) 
0.127* 
(0.052) 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
   -0.297*** 
(0.172) 
0.121 
(0.142) 
0.106 
(0.143) 
-0.297** 
(0.153) 
Constant -13.31* 
(0.54) 
-12.91* 
(0.70) 
-13.17* 
(0.69) 
-12.67* 
(0.75) 
-14.08* 
(0.70) 
-14.10* 
(0.70) 
-20.47* 
(1.21) 
R2  
Within 
Between  
Overall 
 
0.26 
0.15 
0.22 
 
0.30 
0.00 
0.07 
 
0.31 
0.00 
0.04 
 
0.32 
0.03 
0.01 
 
0.26 
0.40 
0.38 
 
0.27 
0.41 
0.38 
 
0.28 
0.57 
0.50 
# obs. 
# groups 
440 
61 
436 
61 
436 
60 
436 
60 
436 
60 
436 
60 
436 
60 
* significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 10% 
lgdp is dropped because of multicollinearity  
R.E. : Random effects estimation 
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Table 19. Regression results of fixed effects estimation for the tertiary 
sector. Dependent variable: log (FDI per capita) 
Expl. Variables Tertiary 
1 
Tertiary 
2 
Tertiary 
3 
Tertiary 
4 
Tertiary 
5 
Tertiary 
6 
Tertiary 
7 R.E. 
GDP growth 0.035* 
(0.016) 
0.048* 
(0.018) 
0.049* 
(0.018) 
0.050* 
(0.018) 
0.046* 
(0.017) 
0.037** 
(0.018) 
0.032*** 
(0.017) 
Year 0.219* 
(0.022) 
0.200* 
(0.024) 
0.191* 
(0.024) 
0.189* 
(0.024) 
0.168* 
(0.025) 
0.171* 
(0.025) 
0.204* 
(0.020) 
Log GDP 0.999* 
(0.371) 
1.521* 
(0.411) 
0.967** 
(0.440) 
1.083* 
(0.445) 
1.057** 
(0.439) 
1.084* 
(0.436) 
0.916* 
(0.144) 
Democratic 
accountab. 
 0.110 
(0.088) 
0.067 
(0.089) 
0.101 
(0.091) 
0.162*** 
(0.091) 
0.182** 
(0.091) 
0.171** 
(0.084) 
Ethnic tensions  -0.176*** 
(0.100) 
-0.330* 
(0.108) 
-0.334* 
(0.108) 
-0.379* 
(0.107) 
-0.343* 
(0.107) 
-0.159*** 
(0.088) 
Civil liberties  0.016 
(0.131) 
0.016 
(0.129) 
-0.002 
(0.130) 
-0.002 
(0.128) 
-0.003 
(0.127) 
-0.078 
(0.097) 
Law and order   0.382* 
(0.119) 
0.409* 
(0.120) 
0.482* 
(0.121) 
0.440* 
(0.121) 
0.327* 
(0.105) 
Internal 
conflict 
  0.031 
(0.050) 
0.030 
(0.050) 
0.040 
(0.049) 
0.031 
(0.049) 
0.021 
(0.046) 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
   -0.248 
(0.156) 
-0.140 
(0.157) 
-0.158 
(0.156) 
-0.320** 
(0.138) 
Corruption     -0.381* 
(0.114) 
-0.369* 
(0.113) 
-0.170*** 
(0.099) 
Socio-economic 
conditions 
     0.113* 
(0.044) 
0.128* 
(0.042) 
Constant -20.71* 
(2.99) 
-24.63* 
(3.28) 
-20.98* 
(3.43) 
-21.46* 
(3.44) 
-20.38* 
(3.40) 
-21.28* 
(3.40) 
-20.52* 
(1.13) 
R2  
Within 
Between  
Overall 
 
0.39 
0.61 
0.58 
 
0.40 
0.63 
0.57 
 
0.43 
0.61 
0.57 
 
0.43 
0.63 
0.58  
 
0.45 
0.56 
0.55 
 
0.46 
0.58 
0.56 
 
0.44 
0.66 
0.61 
# obs. 
# groups 
492 
67 
450 
60 
450 
60 
450 
60 
450 
60 
450 
60 
450 
60 
* significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 10% 
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Table 20. Regression results of fixed effects estimation for specific 
industries in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Dependent 
variable: log (FDI per capita) 
Expl. Variables Food and 
beverage. 
Textiles Chemicals Electronics 
 
Business Finance 
 
GDP growth 0.008 
(0.026) 
0.005 
(0.033) 
0.031 
(0.027) 
0.062 
(0.045) 
0.039 
(0.026) 
0.022 
(0.025) 
Year 0.131* 
(0.028) 
0.059 
(0.039) 
0.080* 
(0.032) 
0.065 
(0.052) 
0.190* 
(0.031) 
0.211* 
(0.029) 
Democratic 
accountab. 
-0.032 
(0.141) 
-0.015 
(0.200) 
-0.214 
(0.167) 
-0.177 
(0.226) 
0.266 
(0.177) 
-0.012 
(0.132) 
Ethnic tensions 0.105 
(0.183) 
-0.503 
(0.241)** 
-0.339*** 
(0.194) 
-0.559** 
(0.283) 
-0.036 
(0.186) 
-0.022 
(0.170) 
Civil liberties -0.305 
(0.206) 
-0.244 
(0.254) 
-0.181 
(0.220) 
-0.465 
(0.357) 
0.206 
(0.221) 
-0.278 
(0.204) 
Law and order -0.072 
(0.196) 
0.435 
(0.278) 
0.373*** 
(0.204) 
0.377 
(0.320) 
-0.310 
(0.217) 
-0.143 
(0.197) 
Internal 
conflicts 
0.087 
(0.069) 
0.018 
(0.096) 
0.280* 
(0.076) 
0.249** 
(0.113) 
-0.018 
(0.081) 
0.090 
(0.066) 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
0.124 
(0.217) 
-0.205 
(0.299) 
0.280 
(0.231) 
 
-0.613 
(0.485) 
0.270 
(0.260) 
-0.204 
(0.208) 
Corruption 0.089 
(0.159) 
-0.218 
(0.199) 
-0.235 
(0.158) 
-0.613 
(0.485) 
 
-0.033 
(0.199) 
0.230 
(0.155) 
Socio-economic 
conditions 
0.154** 
(0.066) 
0.013 
(0.081) 
0.141** 
(0.071) 
0.190*** 
(0.100) 
0.293* 
(0.071) 
0.154* 
(0.061) 
Constant -15.16* 
(1.20) 
-12.25* 
(1.60) 
-15.71* 
(1.30) 
-11.22* 
(2.01) 
-16.65* 
(1.73) 
-13.97* 
(1.22) 
R2  
Within 
Between  
Overall 
 
0.18 
0.47 
0.37 
 
0.08 
0.04 
0.04 
 
0.23 
0.19 
0.08 
 
0.22 
0.26 
0.15 
 
0.31 
0.12 
0.11 
 
0.22 
0.51 
0.34 
# obs. 
# groups 
249 
38 
189 
33 
217 
35 
130 
24 
224 
37 
333 
50 
* significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 10% 
R.E. : Random effects estimation 
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Table 21. Regression results of fixed effects estimation for specific 
industries in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors continued. 
Dependent variable: log (FDI per capita) 
Expl. Variables Transport Trade 
GDP growth 0.067** 
(0.035) 
-0.002 
(0.017) 
Year 0.402* 
(0.043) 
0.120* 
(0.020) 
Democratic 
accountability 
0.139 
(0.195) 
0.252* 
(0.102) 
Ethnic tensions -0.135 
(0.244) 
-0.530* 
(0.120) 
Civil liberties 0.217 
(0.255) 
-0.006 
(0.122) 
Law and order 0.319 
(0.275) 
0.199 
(0.132) 
Internal conflict 0.011 
(0.093) 
0.155* 
(0.051) 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
-0.608*** 
(0.342) 
-0.051 
(0.163) 
Corruption -0.005 
(0.245) 
-0.242* 
(0.112) 
Socio-economic 
conditions 
0.290* 
(0.091) 
(0.060) 
(0.045) 
Constant -18.12* 
(1.60) 
-13.11* 
(0.77) 
R2  
Within 
Between  
Overall 
 
0.39 
0.07 
0.23 
 
0.30 
0.09 
0.12 
# obs. 
# groups 
315 
50 
356 
50 
* significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 10% 
R.E. : Random effects estimation 
 
 
A Hausman test rejected the hypothesis that the fixed effects are uncorrelated 
with the regressors in the “food and beverages” regression. Hence, the results 
from the random effects estimation are biased, and therefore not shown. 
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Table 22. Including lagged variables: Regression results of fixed effects 
estimation for the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Dependent 
variable: log (FDI per capita). 
 
We use fixed effect estimation as the main approach, but all of the 
specifications are also run with OLS. These estimates are not reported here, 
and note that several different specifications have been tested for all three 
sectors. The results from using a four year lag were not significant in any 
specification, and are not reported here. 
 
 
Expl. Variables Primary 
1 
Primary 
2 
Primary 
3 
Primary 
4 
 Second. 
1 
Second. 
2 
GDP growth 0.050** 
(0.025) 
0.024 
(0.022) 
0.023 
(0.022) 
0.021 
(0.023) 
 0.023 
(0.020) 
0.020 
(0.019) 
Year 0.196* 
(0.026) 
0.172* 
(0.023) 
0.186* 
(0.026) 
0.183* 
(0.026) 
 0.165* 
(0.028) 
0.166* 
(0.025) 
Log GDP      0.778*** 
(0.460) 
0.637 
(0.447) 
Log inflation        
Trade (in % of 
GDP) 
       
Democratic 
accountability 
-0.209*** 
(0.124) 
-0.181*** 
(0.104) 
-0.134 
(0.105) 
-0.134 
(0.110) 
 -0.180*** 
(0.099) 
-0.163*** 
(0.089) 
Ethnic tensions -0.390* 
(0.146) 
 
 
 
 
  -0.151 
(0.114) 
 
Ethnic 
Tensions, t-1 
 -0.214*** 
(0.131) 
    -0.127 
(0.111) 
Ethnic 
Tensions, t-2 
  -0.139 
(0.129) 
    
Ethnic 
Tensions, t-3 
   0.079 
(0.136) 
   
Constant -11.05* 
(0.76) 
-11.71* 
(0.66) 
-12.39* 
(0.67) 
-13.40* 
(0.68) 
 -17.11* 
(3.69) 
-16.10* 
(3.62) 
R2  
Within 
Between  
Overall 
 
0.19 
0.02 
0.01 
 
0.17 
0.03 
0.002 
 
0.16 
0.04 
0.001 
 
0.15 
0.02 
0.003 
  
0.21 
0.50 
0.44 
 
0.21 
0.49 
0.45 
# obs. 
# groups 
370 
54 
346 
53 
320 
51 
300 
51 
 440 
61 
412 
60 
* significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 10% 
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Table 22 continued 
 
 
Expl. Variables Second. 
3 
Second. 
4 
 Tertiary 
 
GDP growth 0.031** 
(0.014) 
0.028*** 
(0.015) 
 0.048* 
(0.016) 
Year 0.137* 
(0.020) 
0.148* 
(0.021) 
 0.204* 
(0.021) 
Log GDP 0.568 
(0.355) 
0.464 
(0.373) 
 1.093* 
(0.460) 
Democratic 
accountability 
 0.067 
(0.074) 
 0.147*** 
(0.079) 
Ethnic tensions, 
t-1 
   -0.131 
(0.095) 
Ethnic 
Tensions, t-3 
-0.140 
(0.069) 
-0.221* 
(0.089) 
  
Civil liberties 
 
 
 
  -0.080 
(0.120) 
Law and order    0.171*** 
(0.104) 
Internal conflict -0.079 
(0.086) 
  0.017 
(0.043) 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
   -0.196 
(0.133) 
Constant -16.21* 
(2.88) 
-15.11* 
(3.08) 
 -21.56* 
(3.24) 
R2  
Within  
Between 
Overall 
 
0.23 
0.62 
0.58 
 
0.21 
0.48 
0.47 
  
0.45 
0.68 
0.63 
# obs. 
# groups 
385 
58 
357 
58 
 425 
59 
* significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 10% 
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Appendix 3: List of countries and descriptive statistics 
 
Our dataset contains 66 countries with at least two years of information on 
industry-level FDI flows and corresponding information on social 
development: 
 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, China, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, 
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, TFYR of Macedonia, Thailand, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Viet 
Nam, Zambia. 
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Table 23. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP growth 518 3.563622 3.682971 -12.6003 18.83041
Log GDP 519 8.419438 1.474179 4.957212 10.68371
Trade 483 78.53521 55.11911 5.20687 396.6755
Log inflation 432 1.777109 1.376728 -2.879301 8.920216
FDI to the 
primary sector 
498 647.2604 2003.458 -2237.941 19943.57
  -agriculture,    
hunting, forestry
368 27.24739 116.4642 -429.3015 1030
  -mining, 
quarrying, 
petroleum
423 728.2711 2149.865 -2237.941 19929.17
FDI to the 
secondary 
sector 
551 2792.438 10502.42 -5487.85 143274
  -food, 
beverages, 
tobacco 
323 315.8549 984.1931 -7249 7757
-textiles, 
clothing,
leather
254 142.1313 539.7095 -584.4586 5940.115
-chemicals, 
chemical 
products
276 848.8422 2743.089 -5800 26196
-electrical and  
electronic 
equipment
161 1100.992 4117.307 -1864.737 38407
FDI to the 
tertiary sector 
572 5047.701 16515.78 -3115.173 205728
-trade 468 834.0077 2451.528 -11218.89 19563
-transport 433 959.8477 5414.099 -4231.211 83319
-finance 445 1772.293 5382.835 -10894 64191
-business 299 2880.522 11393.63 -430.9505 169048.1
Democratic 
accountability 
480 4.464583 1.463115 0 6
Ethnic tensions 480 4.741667 1.173798 1 6
Civil liberties 517 2.638298 1.510533 1 7
Law and order 480 4.510417 1.439053 1 6
Internal conflict 480 9.979167 2.245753 2 12
Bureaucratic 
quality 
480 2.784375 1.102694 0 4
Corruption 480 3.90625 1.401447 0 6
Socio-econ. 
Conditions 
480 6.297917 1.762754 1 11
Military in 
politics 
480 4.472917 1.671103 0 6
Religion in 
politics 
480 5.175 1.080574 1 6
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Table 24. Correlation coefficients 
 Total FDI GDP growth Log 
GDP 
Trade Log 
inflation 
Democr. 
accounta 
Ethnic 
tens.  
Total FDI 1.0000       
GDP growth -0.0194 1.0000      
Log GDP 0.7822 -0.0751 1.0000     
Trade 0.2184 0.2583 0.0546 1.0000    
Log inflation -0.5369 -0.1746 -0.5814 -0.1441 1.0000   
Democratic 
accountab. 
0.5386 -0.1887 0.6605 -0.1027 -0.3725 1.0000  
Ethnic 
tensions 
0.4229 0.0000 0.4793 0.0872 -0.2094 0.4538 1.0000 
Civil 
liberties 
-0.5629 0.2116 -0.6870 0.1347 0.3147 -0.7209 -0.3479 
Law and 
order 
0.6701 -0.0189 0.7779 0.1316 -0.6277 0.6346 0.4560 
Internal 
conflict 
0.5719 -0.0017 0.6135 0.2335 -0.5371 0.5754 0.4889 
Bureaucr. 
quality 
0.5633 -0.0069 0.8259 0.0677 -0.5829 0.6506 0.3538 
Corruption 0.5602 -0.0961 0.7293 0.0352 -0.4210 0.7122 0.3837 
Socio-
economic 
conditions 
0.4308 0.2237 0.5032 0.1274 -0.3755 0.2053 0.1734 
Military in 
politics 
0.6239 -0.0817 0.7651 0.2082 -0.4936 0.6984 0.4476 
Religion in 
politics 
0.6995 -0.1394 0.6396 0.0824 -0.2955 0.4448 0.4165 
Government 
stability 
0.3513 0.0617 0.1445 0.1671 -0.3315 0.1257 0.1307 
External 
conflict 
0.4427 -0.0848 0.4306 0.0072 -0.3064 0.4195 0.3808 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C M I  
 47 
 Civil 
liberties 
Law and 
order 
Internal 
conflict 
Bureaucrat. 
quality 
Corruption Socio-
ec. cond. 
Military 
in 
politics 
Civil 
liberties 
1.0000       
Law and 
order 
-0.5932 1.0000      
Internal 
conflict 
-0.4353 0.7911 1.0000     
Bureaucratic 
quality 
-0.5691 0.7193 0.5610 1.0000    
Corruption -0.6752 0.7063 0.5378 0.6954 1.0000   
Socio-
economic 
conditions 
-0.3161 0.4139 0.3024 0.4767 0.3228 1.0000  
Military in 
politics 
-0.6379 0.7304 0.7079 0.7149 0.7106 0.3674 1.0000 
Religion in 
politics 
-0.4282 0.4837 0.4476 0.3748 0.4570 0.3434 0.5048 
Government 
stability 
-0.0060 0.2249 0.2751 0.0960 0.0493 0.1260 0.1446 
External 
conflict 
-0.3335 0.4128 0.4882 0.2312 0.2809 0.1875 0.4446 
 
 
 
 Religion 
in 
politics 
Government 
stability 
External 
conflict 
Religion in 
politics 
1.0000   
Government 
stability 
0.1973 1.0000  
External 
conflict 
0.4472 0.1849 1.0000 
 
 
  
Summary 
 
Investment is crucial for economic development. A number 
of empirical studies document a relationship between 
social development and aggregate foreign direct investment 
(FDI). This study complements aggregate studies by 
conducting an econometric analysis of the relationship 
between social development variables and FDI flows at the 
industry level. 
We find that democratic accountability has a 
negative association with FDI in the secondary industries, 
but a positive one in the tertiary ones. This result suggests 
a more nuanced relationship between democracy and FDI 
than indicated by aggregate studies.  
Law and order is found conducive to investment 
in both the secondary and tertiary industries. Internal 
conflict deters investment in the secondary sector. Neither 
law and order nor internal conflict affect FDI in the 
primary industries, which might reflect an ability to effect 
private security arrangements in the extractive industries. 
Corruption increases FDI flows in the tertiary 
sector, but is unimportant elsewhere. This relationship can 
be traced to the trade industry, possibly reflecting the 
frequency with which this industry encounters 
bureaucratic obstacles.  
Finally, increased ethnic tensions are associated 
with greater FDI flows. However, we find evidence of a 
causal relationship in the secondary industries only. 
Moreover, the relationship depends on the inclusion of 
certain countries in the sample. 
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